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Elizabeth Burleson*
INTRODUCTION
Broad and rapid ratification of the Paris Agreement under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides a path
by which regions within nations can advance energy innovation and
climate resilience. Federalism is underway in the form of dynamic
governance within and among states.1 This Article analyzes the multidimensional energy-climate governance approach that the global
community seeks to carry out.
It is no small task to balance greenhouse gas sinks and sources by
the middle of the century. Cities account for 70 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions.2 The Compact of Mayors has inspired over
360 cities to commit to cutting their emissions 17 percent by 2030.3 In
addition to ramping up the capacity of communities large and small to
*
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1. See, e.g., John H. Knox, The United States, Environmental Agreements, And
The Political Question Doctrine, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 933 (2015).
2. Gayathri Vaidyanathan, How to Measure the Results of Paris Talks? It’s a
Work in Progress, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/14/stories/1060029449 [http://perma.cc. 86MX-GYVR].
3. Laura Lee Dooley, 400 Cities Join Compact of Mayors Pledge to Cut
Emissions, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.wri.org/content/
400-cities-join-compact-mayors-pledge-cut-emissions
[http://perma.cc/Y8QCZ5V3].
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reduce the sources of greenhouse gases, indigenous communities are
core to initiatives that can sustain forests as sinks. This Article
analyzes the Paris Agreement. It will consider the role that regions
within nation state boundaries have played in launching climate
leadership in the face of a substantial collective action challenge. Low
lying cities and front line indigenous communities have begun rallying
available resources towards energy innovation and climate adaptation.
This Article concludes that cooperative federalism has expanded in the
climate context, providing transboundary climate leadership and
ongoing means of energy innovation and climate resilience
engagement.
PARIS AGREEMENT: SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT AND CLIMATE
IMPLEMENTATION
The 2015 Paris Agreement provides tools to collectively ratchet up
climate ambition and implementation. The Paris Agreement4 and
accompanying COP 21 Decision5 together map collective climate
engagement on such thorny elements as:
Mitigation - reducing emissions fast enough to achieve the
temperature goal
A transparency system and global stock-take - accounting
for climate action
Adaptation - strengthening ability of countries to deal with
climate impacts
Loss and damage - strengthening ability to recover from
climate impacts

4. Conference of the Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change,
Paris
Agreement,
U.N.
Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. The Paris
Agreement went into effect on Nov. 4, 2016. Id.
5. Conference of the Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement in Decision 1 of
the COP 21 Decisions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter COP 21 Decision].
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Support - including finance, for nations to build clean,
resilient futures.6
Key elements of the Paris Agreement include: submitting and
implementing increasingly ambitious nationally determined
contributions in five-year cycles.7 The requisite funding and the
facilitative nature of five-year review/stock taking cycles remain broad
brush rather than clearly defined, yet a transparency framework is
expected to help ratchet up implementation.8 Parties have set a longterm trajectory through national climate action plans and are
coordinating peaking emissions as soon as possible.9 The Paris
Agreement sets forth the principle that future national plans will be no
less ambitious than existing ones. The 188 climate action plans
submitted to date serve as a foundation for higher ambition.10 At the
core of the Agreement, parties will submit their updated plans, called
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), every five years in a
process that seeks to ratchet up climate ambition.11
Increasing ambition is to occur through a two-stage process,
recognizing that the current provisions do not add up to the agreed
upon 2°C temperature goal let alone 1.5°C.12 The global average
temperature has already risen roughly 1°C (1.75°F) from pre-industrial
levels. Vulnerable nations seeking to set 1.5°C (2.7°F) as a legally
binding long term mitigation target did not succeed in requiring the
global community to meet this scientific threshold but did manage to

6. Id.; Press Release, UNFCCC, Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change:
195 Nations Set Path to Keep Temperature Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius (Dec.
12, 2015) (on file with author).
7. See Paris Agreement, Art. 14, supra note 4.
8. Meinhard Doelle, The Paris Climate Agreement: Historic Breakthrough in
Spite of Shortcomings, DALEHOUSIE U. (Dec. 13, 2015), https://blogs.dal.ca/
melaw/2015/12/13/the-paris-climate-agreement-historic-breakthrough-in-spite-ofshortcomings/.
9. See CAIT CLIMATE DATA EXPLORER, http://cait.wri.org/indc/ (last visited
2016). The World Resources Institute tracks Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) of countries to better determine whether the world will
achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.
10. See Press Release, UNFCCC, supra note 6.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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gain broad consensus for its inclusion as a strongly stated aspirational
goal.13
Until the Paris Agreement enters into force, an interim 2018
facilitative dialogue will take stock of collective country action.14 This
will occur under the accompanying COP 21 Decision to the Paris
Agreement and should inform the nature and caliber of future
commitments.15 The global community must now set to work
iteratively implementing and strengthening climate action.
SUSTAINABILITY PREAMBLE
The Paris Agreement Preamble embraces climate coordination in
the broader global sustainability endeavor.16 It does so by referencing
the sustainable development goals and by specifically
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of
humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address
climate change, respect, promote and consider their
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health,
the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities,
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well
13. See Camila Domonoske, 2 Degrees, $100 Billion: The World Climate
Agreement, By the Numbers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2015, 5:33 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/12/459502597/2-degrees-100billion-the-world-climate-agreement-by-the-numbers?utm_medium=
RSS&utm_campaign=environment [http://perma.cc/HDN8-TTQE].
14. See, e.g., GNelson, CAN Position on the Facilitative Dialogue 2018,
CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L (Apr. 19, 2017, 7:27 AM),
http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-facilitative-dialogue2018-april-2017 [http://perma.cc./VM7G-ECGN].
15. See id.
16. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 1. The text of the Paris Agreement
Preamble reads as follows:
Welcoming the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution
A/RES/70/1, ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development,’ in particular its goal 13, and the adoption of the Addis
Ababa Action Agenda of the third International Conference on Financing
for Development and the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction.
Id.
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as gender equality, empowerment
intergenerational equity.17
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and

The preamble emphasizes the significant gap between the aggregate
effect of parties’ mitigation pledges and actually holding the increase
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C let alone 1.5°C.
TAKING STOCK OF PARIS DIPLOMACY AND SUSTAINABILITY
ENGAGEMENT
Significant elements that did not find landing zones in Paris include:
compensation for loss and damages, reference to indigenous rights in
operative areas of the agreement, and a call for curbing fossil-fuel
extraction.18 Finance and technology commitments may be more
diffuse than those set forth in the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).19 Strict prohibitions and substantive
affirmative duties have been put aside in favor of engaging the global
community in iterative reviews that can collectively meet long term
reductions in global temperatures and facilitate climate
adaptation/resilience.
Parties are legally bound to a transparency framework to track
progress. They must communicate their increasingly ambitious
nationally determined contributions. At the core of the Paris
Agreement are five-year cycle reviews of each nationally determined
contribution. While legally bound to communicate nationally
determined contributions, parties are not legally bound to exact
nationally determined contribution targets. Global stocktaking offers
steppingstones for coordinated mitigation, adaptation, technology
17. Id.
18. Personal observation of author who has been an IUCN Delegate to the climate

talks and who can highlight the debates that do not garner sufficient consensus to be
included in COP outcome documents.
19. See Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/
items/9485.php [hereinafter UNFCCC, Status Agreement Tracker]; see also United
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of
its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (May 15, 1992). One
hundred sixty-five countries ratified the UNFCCC. The convention entered into
force March 21, 1994. See id.
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sharing and support. By holding ongoing, five-year stocktakes20
midway through the nationally determined contribution cycle, an
upwardly ratcheting climate response must do the heavy lifting of
keeping global warming well below 2°C let alone 1.5°C above preindustrial levels.21
Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations may react more
unpredictably to global temperature increases than negotiators
anticipate. How climate feedbacks drive future climate change is not a
highly granular mapping exercise yet. Generally speaking, in addition
to small island nations, low lying main lands are increasingly front
line, vulnerable communities – “Manhattan needs 1.5°C. So does
Miami and so does Shanghai.”22 While broadening understanding of
the gap between political will and requisite curbing of greenhouse
gasses is translating into greater coordination. The gap remains vast.
Parties have agreed to keep meeting to try to agree on how to mitigate,
adapt, share environmentally and socially sound tech, integrate
sustained support, etc. . . . Every five years, global stocktakes will
review progress towards the long-term goal of keeping global
temperature rise well below 2°C (3.6°F) and limiting warming to
1.5°C.23 To this end, the international community is trying to mobilize
$100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries and has
just agreed to link the Green Climate Fund (GCF) with the Technology
Mechanism to ramp up environmentally and socially sound climate
responses going forward.24
Tracking (1) the ways in which greenhouse gas reductions occur, (2)
the quantity of reduction and (3) target dates by which reductions
occur, combined with (4) sharing evolving best practices – together
20. See Paris Agreement, Art. 14, supra note 4, at 18-19.
21. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Paris Climate Change

Conference: 29 November – 13 December 2015, 12 INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 1 (2015) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12663e.pdf.
22. Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change: Will ‘1.5 to Stay Alive’ Deal be
Enough to Save Seychelles? THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/climate-change-seychellescop21-economy-collapse [http://perma.cc/Y37Y-PG8E].
23. See Paris Agreement, Art. 4, supra note 4, at 23.
24. See, e.g., SZYMON MIKOLAJCZYK ET AL., LINKING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM WITH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND: MODELS FOR SCALING UP
MITIGATION ACTION 1 (Climate Focus et al. eds., 2016)
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can achieve climate mitigation. It can also guide adaptation and
resilience through facilitative sharing of best practices and support.
HIGH AMBITION RATCHETING ‘AS SOON AS POSSIBLE’ = INCREASING
POLITICAL WILL
The inclusion of the 1.5°C mitigation goal resulted in part from
efforts of the 43-country coalition - Climate Vulnerable Forum well as
the crucial addition of Brazil, Canada, the EU and the US to the newly
gathered High Ambition Coalition.25 Clear long-term mitigation goals
of 2°C and 1.5°C are to be reached through a binding but flexible
hybrid approach that seeks to engage climate coordination. All parties
contribute plans, report on progress towards meeting their plans in
iterative international reviews, and strengthen their contributions in
five-year cycles. The 12-page Paris Agreement sets forth goals,
obligations, and general guidelines, while the 19-page COP 21
Decision details practical elements and reference modalities that need
to be fleshed out in forthcoming climate talks through the new Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).26 The APA is
developing recommendations for modalities, procedures, and
guidelines.27
The hope that the Paris Agreement has infused into global dynamics
is powerful. From a legal frame, the tools suited to reduce dangerous
anthropogenic climate change are still being created. The Paris
Agreement will be formally legally binding when it has been ratified
by at least 55 countries representing 55 percent of global greenhouse
gas emissions and enters into force.28 Even if the Paris Agreement
comes into effect by 2020, general terms are still far more prevalent
than sharp, clearly focused details such as specific rights and
obligations. Under the UNFCCC the parties have drafted a new
25. See Matt McGrath, COP21: US Joins ‘High Ambition Coalition’ for Climate
Deal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment35057282 [http://perma.cc/A8Q2-N9VL].
26. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4; see also COP 21 Decision, supra note 5,
at 1.
27. See, e.g., Bonn Climate Change Conference - May 2017, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/
bonn_may_2017/meeting/10076.php.
28. See Paris Agreement, Art. 21, supra note 4, at 31.
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framework agreement in need of a range of future substantive
decisions to operationalize climate implementation.29 To peak
greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and balance sources and
sinks in the second half of this century, long lasting broad participation
needs to begin immediately.
FOREST SINKS + ECOSYSTEM-BASED MITIGATION & ADAPTATION
(ARTICLE 5)
Nationally Determined Contributions can draw on the latest
available UNFCCC and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) guidelines and methodologies and engage in ecosystem and
biodiversity wise mitigation and adaptation decision-making that
results in environmental and human integrity. Afforestation on
degraded lands and wetlands can help balance greenhouse gas
emissions and sinks. Facilitating environmentally and socially sound
land use, forestry, agriculture best practices can contribute to rapidly
decarbonizing the global economy by the middle of century.30 In
particular, land-use sectors including agriculture and forests generally
account for 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.31
Deforestation of tropical forests, core carbon-sequestering natural
systems, can curb up to a third of global greenhouse gas emissions.32
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) notes that
comprehensive coverage of greenhouse gas sources and sinks from all
major economic sectors prevents double counting of emission
reductions. Further, it recognizes and supports the “current role and

29. Preliminary Legal Assessment of the Paris Agreement, LEGAL RESPONSE
INITIATIVE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://legalresponseinitiative.org/preliminary-legalassessment-of-the-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/2Z74-FX8K].
30. See Goldenberg, supra note 22.
31. Brittany Patterson, Trees Grow Taller in Climate Deal, but Financial
Possibilities Shrink, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/14/stories/1060029450
[http://perma.cc/RN2U-QRPU]
(noting that further finance is needed for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation, or REDD+, the U.N. program that can be used to reduce
deforestation and land degradation”).
32. See id.
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future potential of the land sector and all terrestrial, marine and coastal
ecosystems as effective natural sinks and reservoirs.”33
The Paris Agreement did not retain earlier draft language on
“reaching greenhouse gas emissions neutrality in the second half of the
century,” as a result of oil producer resistance – as a concession to
OPEC states, final language leaves open some fossil fuels burning, as
long overall emissions are absorbed by new forests and other sinks.34
The final Article 5 states,
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in
Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse
gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking
will take longer for developing country Parties, and to
undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with
best available science, so as to achieve a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks
of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the
basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty.35
This signals that there is political will to facilitate offsetting
emissions through forests sinks and other greenhouse gas reservoirs.
Countries are encouraged to establish and strengthen policies to save
remaining intact forests and to engage in state and non-state
mobilization of support to help stop deforestation and support
synergistic social integrity and nature based solutions. In one of the
strongest recognitions of the importance of forests to date, reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation signals that
sustainable forest stewardship can be a valuable investment.
Conservation of existing and enhancement of new forests – as carbon

33. ICUN POSITION ON UNFCCC NEGOTIATIONS IN 2015, INTERNATIONAL
UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE (2015), http://cmsdata.iucn.org/
downloads/eng_iucn_2015_position_paper_for_unfccc___final.pdf.
34. Sewell Chan, Key Points of the Paris Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climatetalks/key-points-of-the-final-paris-climate-draft [http://perma.cc/4UTV-TKDW].
35. Paris Agreement, Art. 4, supra note 4, at 22.
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stocks and forest communities – opens the door to joint mitigation and
adaptation.36
SHORT TERM - NEXT STEPS
A pre-2020 ambition mechanism rests upon substantial support
materializing for effective greenhouse gas mitigation and climate
adaptation. Additional action before 2020 is essential to keeping
temperature rise well below 2°C.37 Participants at COP 21 lamented
this mitigation gap and its corresponding adaptation gap. Interim
action is included in the COP 21 Decision. Leading up to the Paris
Agreement’s entry into force, parties are called upon to implement past
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) decisions and cancel emissions units issued therein.38
Importantly, parties are called upon to ensure environmental integrity
and transparently report internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes, without seeking to double count any emission reductions.39
The global community continues to call for an all hands on deck
approach from developed countries and anyone else with the capacity
to offer scaled up climate finance to support interim mitigation and
adaptation.40
The new linkage between support and environmentally sound
technology sharing mechanisms can go a long way to actualizing
climate mitigation and adaptation implementation.
The universal nature of the Paris Agreement differs substantially
from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC that required emissions
reductions by developed countries listed in one annex while requesting

36. See Paris Agreement, Art. 5, supra note 4, at 23.
37. See, e.g., FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR5), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL

(Apr. 9, 2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[http://perma.cc/4RTP-6AEH].
38. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 15.
39. See id.
40. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD),
BioRes Paris Update #3 ‘The End of a Journey, the Start of Another’ as Paris
Agreement Adopted, BIORES (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/
biores/news/biores-paris-update-3-”the-end-of-a-journey-the-start-of-another”-asparis [http://perma.cc/Z7UW-7R8R].
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voluntary efforts by developing countries listed in a second annex.41
In contrast to Kyoto, the Paris Agreement relies on the political will of
respective parties to collectively offer ambitious climate action
plans.42 This bottom up process that emerged in Copenhagen (2009)43
was formalized in Cancun (2010)44 and has seen the submission of a
range of voluntary targets by countries.45 Both the type and levels of
discretion have been left to Parties, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol
(“top down”) approach. The Kyoto Protocol involved greater rigor but
has seen a shrinking participation rate.46 As Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs) are announced, the open question
remains whether they will add up to the scientifically required climate
response necessary to avert catastrophic levels of climate change.

41. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M.
22 (1998); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Making Sand Castles as the Tide Comes In:
Legal Aspects of Climate Justice, 2 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 42 (2011)
(in partnership with the Environmental Law Institute) [hereinafter Burleson, Legal
Aspects of Climate Justice]; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Energy Revolution and
Disaster Response in the Face of Climate Change, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 169 (2011)
[hereinafter Burleson, Energy Revolution]; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate
Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 543 (2010) [hereinafter Burleson, Climate Change Consensus]; see also
Elizabeth Burleson, A Climate of Extremes: Transboundary Conflict Resolution, 32
VT. L. REV. 477 (2008) [hereinafter Burleson, A Climate of Extremes]; see also
Elizabeth Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, 41 U. OF S.F. L. REV.
373 (2007).
42. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41.
43. See UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess., Report of the
conference: Copenhagen Accord, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Mar. 30, 2010).
44. See UNFCCC, Draft Resolution, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Cancun, Mex. Nov.
29-Dec.10, 2010, U.N. DOC. FCCC/AWGLGA/2010/6.7 (Dec. 10, 2010).
45. See NDC Registry, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/items/9433.php.
46. Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 2. The Paris Agreement Preamble
highlights the continued importance of UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol leading up to
Paris Agreement Implementation “[s]tressing the urgency of accelerating the
implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol in order to enhance pre2020 ambition.” Id.
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Currently, climate plans representing 95 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions have achieved broad participation.47 It
remains to be seen whether this broad participation has come at the
expense of capping global emissions at a safe threshold. Collective
efforts will still result in an approximately 3°C temperature increase.48
Currently insufficient ambition leaves a substantial post-2020 gap in
meeting the temperature targets of 2°C let alone 1.5°C. Initial
commitments are still further out than requisite for curbing dangerous
climate change. Short-term support can bring down this climate curve
and ease the long-term burden. Heavy lifting early on can be effective
if parties take seriously that plans should involve at least a base
unconditional commitment and optimize all available best practices as
well as coordinating ramping up new best practices in a range of
climate responses. Instead, whole sectors are still left off the table.49
Short-term climate forcers as well as aviation and shipping remain
areas where substantial ambition could be ratcheted up.
NON-SECTORIAL APPROACH
While 195 countries agreed to commit nearly all of the world’s
countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions, substantial work remains to
be carried out. For instance, sectorial emissions from shipping and
aviation represent 5 percent of humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions
but it remains an open question whether emissions should be tied to
registration countries or the countries in which emissions actually

47. See NDC Registry, supra note 45, at 1.
48. Fiona Harvey, World on Track for 3C of Warming Under Current Global

Climate Pledges, Warns UN, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/03/world-on-track-for-3c-ofwarming-under-current-global-climate-pledges-warns-un [http://perma.cc/D5TWVDS4] (noting that “Current climate commitments are insufficient to reduce
emissions by the amounts needed to avoid dangerous levels of global warming, says
Unep report”).
49. See, e.g., Reducing Emissions from Aviation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/
LNR2-NBZM]; see also The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/
929D-9CXA].
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occur.50 The Marshall Islands is one of the top three ship registries in
the world, but is generally not the location where more than a minute
fraction of greenhouse gases occurs.51 Regulating international trade
and business transactions raises challenging questions such as where
to account for rapidly increasing aviation and shipping emissions.
Tough questions still need to be sorted out in future climate
coordinating efforts. What is said and what is left unsaid remains
important in differentiating responsibilities and following through
with an effective climate response.
MARKET MECHANISMS (COOPERATIVE MECHANISM) (ARTICLE 6)
The ambitious goals of the Agreement, five-year review cycles, and
transparency framework were heralded as significant signals to
markets to encourage investments to be redirected to low greenhouse
gas and climate-resilient sustainable development.52
The Paris Agreement signals that markets are a viable
implementation approach for countries to carry out climate plans. The
Agreement introduces the new term, “internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs),53 to describe carbon currency and
clearly states that a mechanism for ITMOs should be designed to
mitigate rather than merely offset emissions. The Paris Agreement
avoids reference to terminology of market-based approaches as a
concession to countries against them. It also details that some of the
reasons why market mechanisms are not favored need to be clearly
avoided. Countries can transfer units of mitigation outcome to
implement their Nationally Determined Contributions in a manner that
ensures the avoidance of double counting. The caliber of emissions
trading will depend on how robust the accounting guidelines for
50. See Benjamin Hulac, Rules for Ship, Airplane Emissions Left out of Paris
Deal, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2015/12/
14/stories/1060029447 [http://perma.cc/7YPP-UCXK].
51. See, e.g., Marshall Islands, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO SHIP & YACHT REGISTRIES,
https://www.guidetoshipregistries.com/shipregistries-country/marshall-islands
[http://perma.cc/M9QU-CZQW].
52. See Larry Light, Why U.S. Businesses Said “Stay in the Paris Accord,” CBS
NEWS MONEYWATCH (June 2, 2017, 5:30 AM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
paris-climate-agreement-us-corporate-support/ [http://perma.cc/XDB8-TABE].
53. See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.3, supra note 4, at 24.
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Nationally Determined Contributions that are being developed prove
to be in their implementation. The Paris Agreement establishes a new
mechanism to succeed the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism with rules to be adopted at the first meeting of parties after
the Paris Agreement enters into force.54 The Clean Development
Mechanism and other market mechanisms have been strongly
criticized for not addressing environmental integrity and governance.55
Importantly, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC serving as
the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement will be tasked with
designing and implementing robust safeguards and learning from the
design successes and problems of emissions trading to date. The Paris
Agreement does not establish a cap-and-trade program given the lack
of a legally binding emission reduction cap and the voluntary nature
of Nationally Determined Contributions design. The Paris Agreement
welcomes carbon market use to implement national climate plans
without mandating participation or an overall emission cap.56
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon notes that, parties:
[H]ave agreed to binding, robust, transparent rules of the
road to ensure that all countries do what they have agreed
across a range of issues. . . . With these elements in place,
markets now have the clear signal they need to unleash the
full force of human ingenuity and scale up investments that
will generate low-emissions, resilient growth . . . .57
It remains an open question how implementation will remain
sustainable and seriously avoid hot spots.58

54.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
See ICSTD, supra note 40.
See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.3, supra note 4.
UN Chief Hails ‘Monumental’ COP21 Climate Deal, CLIMATE ACTION (Dec.
14, 2015),
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/un_chief_hails_new_
cop21_climate_deal?utm_source=Feeds&utm_campaign=News&utm_medium=rss
[http://perma.cc/L4YD-JAX6].
58. See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4(d), supra note 4, at 24.
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ADAPTATION (ARTICLE 7)
The Paris Agreement recognizes the need for adaptation efforts to
be gender sensitive59 in establishing the adaptation goal of “enhancing
adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability
to climate change” that binds countries to engage with one another on
adaptation planning as each party submits/updates cycles of
accelerated adaptation implementation communications through five
year stocktaking reviews.60 The global community still needs to flesh
out how support will flow to developing countries for adaptation action
in a clear and predictable manner.
LOSS AND DAMAGE (ARTICLE 8)61
Some of the most difficult sticking points in the Paris climate talks
revolved around the reality that the poorest countries that have
contributed the least to cause climate change face the most likely worst
challenges as front line climate communities.62 In recognition of this,
for the first time, developed countries in Paris agreed to include the
following Paris Agreement freestanding Article 8 test stating,
“[p]arties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and
addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of
climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset
events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of
loss and damage.”63 Recognizing loss and damage due to climate
change acknowledges that some climate impacts are difficult or
impossible to adapt to such as vanishing small island nation states
losing all of their land. The free-standing Article 8 extends the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage that established an
interim body at COP 19 to start helping vulnerable countries establish

59.
60.
61.
62.

See Doelle, supra note 8.
See Paris Agreement, Art. 2, supra note 4, at 22.
See Paris Agreement, Art. 8, supra note 4, at 26.
See, e.g., Claire Doole, Climate Change Challenge, RED CROSS,
http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2007_1/4-9.html [http://perma.cc/HA386X6E].
63. See Paris Agreement Art. 8, supra note 4, at 26.
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early warning systems, risk insurance, and other means of coping with
climate change.64
The Agreement’s Article 8 on Loss and Damage was core to acutely
vulnerable countries, yet the core thorny issue is clarified in the
accompanying Paris COP 21 Decision where Parties agree that loss
and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability of
compensation.”65 It is the first time the term loss and damage has been
included in an international agreement. It is a clear recognition of the
impact of climate on the most vulnerable countries. High emitting
countries stopped short of agreeing to liability/compensation for
damage from rising global temperatures.66 At present, the existing
language does not limit the Conference of the parties to the UNFCCC
from extending its competencies under the Convention. It appears that
parties have accepted that the rules on state responsibility for
transboundary pollution are relevant to climate change.
FINANCE (ARTICLE 9) – INFORMAL INFORMALS AND INDABA
CONSENSUS BUILDING
The Paris Agreement’s purpose is phrased as aspirational.
UNFCCC’s common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities still exists but now leans towards national selfdifferentiation rather than developed and developing country annexes.
Parties do reference “in light of different national circumstances” in
reinterpreting existing UNFCCC and Kyoto commitments for instance
in mobilizing finance and technology transfer.67
As at past climate talks, finance was a tough substantive element to
resolve in Paris. Less well-resourced developing countries calling for
robust support to be scaled up met with developed country calls for
64. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with
Climate Change Impacts, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/
8134.php [http://perma.cc/TS9S-QPGF].
65. COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at ¶ 51 (“Agrees that Article 8 of the
Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”).
66. C. Davenport et al., Inside the Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/12/world/paris-climatechange-deal-explainer.html?module=ConversationPieces&region
=Body&action=click&pgtype=article&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/OGJ8-W9AB].
67. Legal Response Initiative, supra note 29.
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large emerging developing countries to make contributions in addition
to developed countries. A give and take occurred in Paris with the Paris
Agreement calling for developed countries to help finance mitigation
and adaptation in developing countries under the existing UNFCCC.
The United States sought the latter to avoid new binding financial
obligations needing congressional approval. At the same time, the
Paris Agreement encourages other parties to provide support
voluntarily.68
Discussions circled around how to ramp up finance beyond $100
billion a year and over what timeframe parties could plausibly
mobilize and review support.69 The COP 21 Decision pushes the
timeframe for mobilizing the $100 billion-a-year goal out through
2025.70 Beyond 2025, it remains an open question what support looks
like for meeting the myriad of climate challenges. Parties have simply
agreed that by 2025 the COP will set a new collective quantified goal
from a floor of $100 billion a year.71 Every two years, developed
countries commit to submit quantitative and qualitative information on
future support, while other countries are encouraged to do so
voluntarily.72
Developing countries have referenced developed country party
duties to provide support under UNFCCC Article 4.73 Technology
transfer and monetary support have not materialized on the scale
envisioned by the drafters of the UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement
references charitable giving from a wide variety of sources and even
the USD $100 billion target is only referenced in the COP 21 Decision
rather than the Paris Agreement.74 The Meeting of Parties to the Paris
Agreement will set a new goal on finance that is above the base level
of USD $100 billion.75 This is to occur prior to 2025.76

68. See NDC Registry, supra note 45.
69. See generally, Janet E. Milne, Storms Ahead: Climate Change Adaptation

Calls for Resilient Funding, 39 VT. L. REV. 819 (2015).
70. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 8.
71. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 26.
72. See id.
73. See UNFCCC Art. 4, supra note 19.
74. See COP 21 Decision, supra note 5, at 54.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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It remains an open question the degree to which public and private
funding pledges announced at the launch of the Paris COP 21 climate
talks can keep climate finance on track to reach the $100 billion goal
by 2020. Similarly, pledges to the Least Developed Countries Fund
are growing and raising the profile of adaptation finance and need to
provide public finance for both mitigation and adaptation. Serious
shortcomings remain regarding when and how to shift investments
away from high-emission activities. Global stocktake participants are
tasked with engaging the global community in actually increasing
support that is adequate to the challenge of transitioning global energy
production away from high emission and toward environmentally and
socially sound climate solutions.77
The facilitative dialogue to take stock in 2018 is tasked with the
heavy lifting of nationally determined contributions matching required
reductions in global temperatures.
The construct that there are fixed developed and developing
countries continue to evolve into dynamic country consensus building
gatherings. The recently congregated High Ambition Coalition
brought together small island nation states with some of the largest
developed country emitting parties to point out to large developing
countries. COP 21 participants from vulnerable small islands pointed
out to large emitting countries that “[y]our right to pull people out of
poverty doesn’t negate my right to survival.”78 India, in particular
gained mixed reactions as the international community recognized its
solar target and leadership but challenged its coal plans.79 Fiona
Harvey notes,
Whatever climate agreement emerges from the international
negotiations in Paris may stem from the most casual of talks
77. See Paris Agreement, supra note 4, at 26.
78. Lisa Friedman, India’s Position Becomes a Challenge as Substantive Climate

Talks on Finances Begin, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2015/12/02/stories/1060028805 [http://perma.cc/J5T4-C94T].
79. Arthur Neslen, India Unveils Global Solar Alliance of 120 countries at Paris
Climate Summit, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/nov/30/india-set-to-unveil-global-solar-alliance-of-120countries-at-paris-climate-summit [http://perma.cc/HD9L-K536] (“Narendra Modi
announces a new alliance of nations and industry on large-scale expansion of solar
energy use in the tropics and beyond”).

2016]

PARIS AGREEMENT & DYNAMIC FEDERALISM

19

between nations. So-called ‘informal informals’—when
delegates huddle on the floor in hallways, crowd around
phones at cafe tables or hunker down however they can—
can help resolve differences more quickly than formal talks,
officials say. At these talks, negotiators can work out
wording and forge consensus in small groups that they can
then work into formal negotiations.80
The High Ambition Coalition reminder “1.5 to stay alive” gained
acceptance from being nearly taboo in serious discussion leading up to
Paris to gaining broad credence among African, Caribbean and Pacific
nations. Then United States joined the High Ambition Coalition,
followed by Canada, Australia and Brazil. These developed oil
producing nations entering the plenary hall with the Marshall Islands
shook up the dynamics of the developing nation negotiating bloc.81
Interestingly, several strategic advisors for small island nations come
from developed countries, further driving climate consensus building
in dynamic directions.
By the end of the Paris climate talks, parties broadly agreed to fiveyear global stocktake cycles to facilitate iterative monitoring of
implementation and provide tailored recommendations for enhancing
each countries approach. This process can begin immediately. Each
party can submit updated plans when they submit the instrument of
ratification of the Paris Agreement. Parties can enhance ambition
levels at any time.
Beyond agreeing to review every five years starting in 2018 before
the Paris Agreement enters into force, parties have yet to hammer out
the detailed modalities of such reviews. They will do so through a nonpunitive, facilitative implementation committee.82 This means that no
sanctions will be applied if a country does not fulfill its contribution.
Countries with more constrained capacities are to receive broad global
support to implement their national contributions.83

80. Fiona Harvey, ‘Informal informals’ May Hold Key to Paris Deal,
CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/12/02/
stories/1060028822 [http://perma.cc/RYV9-WFQL].
81. Author’s personal observation while attending the Paris Climate Conference.
82. See Paris Agreement, Art. 15, supra note 4, at 29.
83. See id.
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The recent first round of submitting Nationally Determined
Contributions demonstrated the level of assistance that many countries
still need in determining their current and future emission and to
specify what ratio of ecosystem, efficiency, and other environmentally
sound technology solutions could facilitate the highest level of
ambition for each country.84 Environmentally and socially sound tech
and nature-based solutions abound and are becoming increasingly
wide spread.85 They are economically viable ways to reduce emissions
and raise resilience. With the fleshing out of accounting guidelines by
the Conference of the Parties, global stocktake reviews can clarify the
dynamics of flows of support as countries report finance biannually
using soon to be established accounting guidelines.
Country submissions relating to finance and technology will be
reviewed by technical experts with an eye for ways of improving
clarity and offering an opportunity to share best practices among
climate plan approaches. The transparency and accounting blueprint
that the Paris Agreement sketches can help parties implement robust
yet flexible climate responses mindful of the dynamic range of
capabilities and geographies relevant to climate strategies.86
TECHNOLOGY MECHANISM (ARTICLE 10)
The COP 21 Decision strengthens the Technology Mechanism (TM)
and establishes a new technology framework to provide overarching
guidance. Ongoing efforts continue among state and non-state actors
to enhance enabling environments and reduce barriers to development
and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies.87

84. See Burleson, Legal Aspects Of Climate Justice, supra note 41; see also
Burleson, Energy Revolution, supra note 41; see also Burleson Climate Change
Consensus, supra note 41; see also Burleson, A Climate of Extremes, supra note 41;
see also Burleson, Multilateral Climate Change Mitigation, supra note 41.
85. See, e.g., CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY CENTRE & NETWORK, https://www.ctcn.org (last visited May 23, 2016).
86. See, e.g., TT: CLEAR, THE UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE,
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/ (last visited May 23, 2016).
87. E.g., BURLESON INSTITUTE, www.BurlesonInstitute.org (last visited May 23,
2016) (providing one portal into Climate Technology Networking on the part of
members of this global alliance to share best practices as environmentally sound
technology evolves).
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Linking the Technology Mechanism and UNFCCC financial bodies
– combined with iterative reviews detailing effectiveness and scale of
support to the Technology Mechanism – may be able to help raise the
funds needed with which to broadly ramp up renewables and other
innovations.88
The Cancun Agreements established the Technology Mechanism
that became operational in 2012.89 This dynamic public-private
innovation hub and network advises developing countries upon
request.90 This author has been among the advisors facilitating joint
research and development, and environmentally sound diffusion
efforts. This work has been done through the Climate Technology
Centre and Network (CTCN) work implementing Technology
Mechanism by responding to requests from developing country parties
on matters related to development and tech sharing. The corresponding
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) provides overarching policy
coordination for the technology framework – supporting developing
countries to specify and share technology needs and evolving best
practices.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres explains that the
global community has most of the technology that we need to address
climate change as well as the capital:
We’re moving on the policy. We just need to focus and
understand the urgency of this. And yes, I do think that we,
as humanity, will be able to address this challenge . . .
88. See ICTSD supra note 40.
89. See Support, TT: CLEAR, THE UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE,

http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/technology-mechanism.html (noting that The CTCN
is the implementation body of the Technology Mechanism). CTCN “facilitates the
transfer of technologies through three core services: (1) Providing technical
assistance at the request of developing countries to accelerate the transfer of climate
technologies; (2) Creating access to information and knowledge on climate
technologies, particularly through its knowledge management system; and (3)
Fostering collaboration among climate technology stakeholders via its network of
regional and sectoral experts.” Id.
90. Support, Nationally Designated Entities by country, TT: CLEAR, THE
UNFCCC TECHNOLOGY CLEARING HOUSE, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/support/
national-designated-entity.html [http://perma.cc/] (noting that requests can be made
through Nationally Designated Entities via secretariat@unfccc.int and
ttclear@unfccc.int).
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[parties] can see that this actually gives them much better air
quality. It gives them better transportation. It gives them
better food security, water security because they are
understanding that we can no longer continue down the path
of increasing the risk of non-action.91
Transfer and development of environmentally and socially sound
technology can be enhanced through sharing existing expertise as well
as engaging in collaborative breakout endeavors to advance beyond
existing energy, resilience, and related climate strategies.
Strengthened technical examination process (TEP) on mitigation
can enhance developing country expert involvement, enhancing
state/non-state actor engagement through formalized technology and
financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC.
Furthermore, the new technical examination process TEP on
adaptation, allows network linking to build on the dialogue to achieve
solutions spaces, innovation hubs, and broad dissemination of
environmentally friendly technologies and practices that meaningfully
address the broad swath of climate change ramifications.
CAPACITY BUILDING (ARTICLE 11)
The COP 21 Decision creates a new capacity-building initiative for
transparency, to facilitate developing country transparency follow
through. Parties agreed that all parties other than least developed
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) should
share information on adaptation, loss and damage, finance, and
technology. These submissions should occur every other year.92
Throughout the climate talks, differentiation of country
responsibilities remains a thorny issue as developed countries urge
everyone to take on a single transparency system while India, China,
and a range of other developing countries urge clear differentiation that

91. U.N. Chief: Paris Convention Represents ‘Turning Point’ In Climate Policy,
NPR (Nov. 23, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/23/457139688/u-nchief-paris-convention-represents-turning-point-in-climate-policy?utm_medium=
RSS&utm_campaign=environment [https://perma.cc/ZX7J-EAH4].
92. See COP 21 Decision, Art. 11, supra note 5.
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would require robust transparency and compliance for developed
countries and self-assessment for developing countries.
Paris consensus settled on a single overarching transparency
framework with subtle differentiation that offers flexibility and
support to developing countries. Once detailed guidance has been
fleshed out, it will be easier to speak to the capacity of the transparency
framework to effectively and equitably address climate change at the
requisite pace to avert catastrophic climate impacts.
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATION + (ARTICLE 12)
A world record 150 country leaders launched landmark climate talks
in Paris.93 As they left and the hard give and take of removing brackets
from draft text proceeded, chipper folk gave away apples and
chocolate to participants hunkering down at the Le Bourget Airport,
just outside Paris.94 Drippy moss panels offered a bit of greenery as
youth with 1.5°C painted on their faces silently held devastatingly
simple messages explaining the cavernous disconnect between
business as usual and requisite climate coordination. Round the clock
negotiations culminated in an outcome far more vague then necessary
but far more detailed than anticipated. Closing the mitigation,
adaptation, support, and technology sharing gap(s) is now left to the
global community with a few more tools with which to start doing the
heavy lifting.
The Paris climate talks infused the process with “political will and a
spirit of unity.”95 The Paris Agreement set clear, long-term and shortterm signals that the global community will gather regularly to
increase ambition. The Agreement marks consensus on transparency
and verification that parties will implement their commitments.
93. See UNFCC, Status Agreement Tracker, supra note 19; see also ENB
Coverage of Climate and Atmosphere Meetings, IISD REPORTING SERVICES,
http://enb.iisd.org/process/climate_atm.htm. [http://perma.cc/PJ4B-V34S].
94. See, e.g., SUMMARY OF THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: 29
NOVEMBER-13 DECEMBER 2015, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 1(International
Institute for Sustainable Development ed., 2015) http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/
enb12663e.pdf.
95. Fiona Harvey, World Bank President Celebrates ‘Game Changer’ Paris
Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
dec/13/world-bank-president-celebrates-game-changer-paris-talks
[http://perma.cc/AC2L-J62L].
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Mobilizing support for the poorest, most vulnerable countries to adapt
is underway, albeit slowly. Gathering in climate forums provides state
and non-state actor engagement with which to share best practices,
build capacity, peer pressure collective action on mitigation and
adaptation, and understand ways to effectively and equitably address
micro/macro climate challenges.96
NGO participation has been integral to climate consensus building.97
The core agreement reaffirms the commitment of parties to public
participation, access to information, education, and climate awareness
under UNFCCC Article 6 and the new Paris Agreement Article 12.
Paris transparency measures should help verify that countries
actually curb greenhouse gas emissions. Implementation remains an
open question. If Nationally Determined Contributions are neither
legally binding nor collectively ambitious then it is a misnomer to say
that climate mitigation implementation is effective. If the goal setting
dialogue itself can increase the ambition of Paris Agreement Parties
then step by step climate action can build momentum, which is a far
cry from kicking any action down the road for a subsequent conference
of the parties gathering in some new venue each year.
The Paris Agreement references efforts to limit global average
temperature rise to 1.5°C with a peaking of emissions as soon as
possible. This is becoming increasingly within the political willpower
of parties because a substantial exchange of information and best
practices has increased understanding that anthropogenic emissions
and removals by sinks can reach net-zero emissions.98 Once state and
non-state actors engaged to the point of believing this achievable, it
became politically feasible to state such a shared vision within the
Paris Agreement. This is being heralded as far more ambitious than
many expected the Agreement to reference. The reasons for this appear
to range from climate catastrophes coming fast and furiously globally,
finance increasingly being mobilized to respond, and responses
increasingly being ramped up to cost effective, economy wide
96. See, e.g., Daniel Bodanskya1, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New
Hope? 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 288 (2016).
97. See, e.g., CLIMATE NETWORK, http://www.climatenetwork.org (last visited
May 23, 2016). The collective efforts of many non-governmental organizations and
the dedicated individuals that help sustain civil society public participation at an
unprecedented scale and scope. Id.
98. See IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), supra note 37.
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solutions. Where there is a way, a path, a shared vision that multilateral
engagement can implement at all levels – then political momentum
will follow. If the people lead, the leaders will follow. If the leaders
lead, the people will engage. It is a recipe of vibrant synergistic state
and non-state actor engagement that goes well beyond conference
semantics and political rhetoric.
Five-year reviews create a means by which to shine a spotlight on
developed countries to increase meaningful support to developing
country mitigation and adaptation implementation. Global state and
non-state actor stocktakes can also highlight where countries with
conditions placed on their plans could remove these question marks
and actually reduce emissions, enhance sinks, and support
adaptation/resilience.
TRANSPARENCY (PEER REVIEW)
Yet, the lack of uniformity among pledge types makes comparison
difficult, and estimating the aggregate effect of greenhouse gas
emission reductions a moving target. Two nongovernmental
organizations have stepped into this space and are providing
substantial clarity. Climate Tracker and the World Resources Institute
are calculating collective climate governance projections and those
seeking to contribute minimally are more easily spotted as public and
private climate response ambitions are ratcheted up globally.99
By the end of the Paris climate talks, 186 submitted plans detailed
how parties committed to lowering greenhouse gas emissions through
2025 or 2030.100 Collectively these plans represent over 95 percent of
global emissions.101 The Paris Agreement now requires all countries to
submit updates to these plans that would ratchet up the stringency of
emissions by 2020 and every five years thereafter, a time frame that
the United States and the European Union urged.102 India had initially
sought a 10-year review cycle.103
99. See CAIT CLIMATE DATA EXPLORER, supra note 9; see also CLIMATE
ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html (last visited May 23,
2016).
100. See NDC Registry, supra note 45.
101. See id.
102. See Chan, supra note 34.
103. See Chan, supra note 34.
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The trifurcated transparency framework legally-binds all parties to
reporting requirements, acknowledging that developing countries’
need support and that small island nation states and least developed
countries need additional capacity building assistance.104 Support
bifurcated between developed countries that shall provide financial
resources, and other countries that are encouraged to provide such
support voluntarily.105
Furthermore, Parties are prohibited from making individual
reservations to the Paris Agreement.106
NEXT STEPS: NOW THE HARD PART
The Paris Agreement sends a powerful signal to the many
thousands of cities, regions, businesses and citizens across
the world already committed to climate action that their
vision of a low-carbon, resilient future is now the chosen
course for humanity this century. —UNFCCC Chair
Figueres.107
Through the Paris Agreement, parties seek to provide a global
support structure for commitments to become stronger over time.
The path from Paris is to be facilitative rather than punitive. At the
same time, nature itself does not negotiate and may not be as flexible
as governance participants. Irrespective of stick, carrot, or [insert one’s
own most effective approach], it is incumbent upon the international
community generally, and those global citizens seeking a stable
climate going forward to coordinate rapid and substantial greenhouse
gas reductions. Negative emissions such as forest sinks need to balance
population growth and any energy intensification that increases
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

104. PUTTING THE ‘ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK’ INTO ACTION:
PRIORITIES FOR A KEY PILLAR OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST.
2-3
(2016),
https://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/
Publications/Climate/SEI-PB-2016-Transparency-under-Paris-Agreement.pdf.
105. See IISD, supra note 95.
106. See Paris Agreement, Art. 27, supra note 4.
107. UNFCC Press Release, supra note 6.
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Recap: the Paris Agreement, negotiated within the dynamic climate
gatherings of the UNFCCC, sets forth the purpose to hold the increase
in the global average temperature to “well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”108 Furthermore, it aims to
facilitate as much greenhouse gas leaving the atmosphere as entering
it in the second half of the twenty-first century. Means of
implementation include integrating sustained finance, environmentally
and socially sound tech sharing and capacity building engagement.
Christiana Figueres voiced what many participants have believed –
“the Paris [A]greement is 10 years too late.”109 At the same time, she
also voiced the optimism with which the international community sees
the balancing of sinks and sources as achievable. She highlighted that
switching to renewables has become increasingly viable as solar has
become 80 percent and wind 40 percent less expensive since 2008.110
Participants in the Paris climate talks spent much of the conference
engaged in the several decades long complex process of sifting through
dense texts with layer upon layer of noncommittal bracketed text. The
Washington Post reported mid conference “Upon this, it seems, does
the fate of the planet depend.”111
Why do people cooperate? One reason people cooperate is as a result
of shared norms.

108. Paris Agreement, Art. 2, supra note 4.
109. Laurie Goering, U.N. Climate Chief Predicts Paris Deal Will Take Effect

Early, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-globalclimatechange-politics-idUSKCN0X925E [http:// perma.cc/8F3M-RVJS].
Delays in negotiating the pact - which sets a goal of keeping global average
temperature rise to ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius - have put ‘an incredible
amount of pressure’ on efforts to revamp the world’s systems . . . Global
emissions of climate-changing gases now need to peak in four years and
then rapidly decline, even as the world’s population and energy demand
grow.
Id. (citation omitted).
110. See id.
111. Chris Mooney, The Thing That Really Doesn’t Make Sense About the Climate
Debate
in
Paris,
THE
WASH.
POST.
(Dec.
4,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/12/04/
scientist-this-is-what-doesnt-make-sense-about-the-paris-climate-debate/
?postshare=4951449257648898&tid=ss_tw [http://perma.cc/YR66-S9SF].
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Much of the past decade has been spent seeking a shared vision with
which to build a legally binding climate agreement. Cooperating
around shared norms can occur as a result of meme evolution.112 It can
also result from ancient understandings of reciprocity and
sustainability.113 New technologies offer the global community an
opportunity to evolve norms regarding use of a given technology.
Energy siting discussions merge innovation and resilience
arguments.114 Regarding ancient collective wisdom, indigenous
peoples meaningful involvement in climate decision-making can
contribute to dynamic network governance that shares best
practices.115
The climate talks under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change have involved unprecedented engagement among
national, subnational, supranational, tribal, scientific, private sector,
and public interest civil society participants. This author has discussed
these developments at length in earlier works.116 This Article will

112. See, e.g., Kevin N. Laland & John Odling-Smee, The evolution of the meme,
in FRONT MATTER (Oxford University Press ed., 2012) OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP
ONLINE,
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/
9780192632449.001.0001/acprof-9780192632449-chapter-6.
113. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Robinson et al., Preface, in COMPARATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & REGULATION (2017).
114. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers & Elizabeth Burleson, Dakota Access to
Justice, Pipeline Politics, Tribal Consultation, Environmental Justice and Rules of
Engagement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATISE (Thomson Reuters West ed., 2nd
ed. 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954308.
115. See id.
116. See e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Civil Society Contributions to Inclusive Climate
Cooperation, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1329 (2015) [hereinafter Burleson, Civil
Society Contributions]; Elizabeth Burleson, Dynamic Governance Innovation, 24
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV 477 (2013); Elizabeth Burleson, Innovation Cooperation:
Energy Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 651 (2011); Elizabeth Burleson,
From Coase to Collaborative Property Decision-making: Green Economy
Innovation, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 79 (2011); Burleson, Legal Aspects
Of Climate Justice, supra note 41; Burleson, Energy Revolution, supra note 41;
Burleson, Climate Change Consensus, supra note 41; Elizabeth Burleson,
Collaborative Community-based Natural Resource Management, 21 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 201 (2010); Burleson, A Climate of Extremes, supra note 41;
Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change and the Bali Roadmap, 12 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L
LAW INSIGHT 4 (2008).
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sketch tribal climate dynamics that have engaged global climateenergy-water decision-making.
Capacity building is core to addressing the climate challenge.117
States engage with non-state actors in large part because neither have
the capacity outright to provide governance without coordinating
among jurisdictions and areas of competency.
Climate change impacts due process, equal protection, and civil
rights to lives and property. 118 Environmental and human rights
interests are at odds in forestry contexts leaving climate negotiations
stymied to equitably protect carbon sinks such as rain forests without
disregarding indigenous land rights.119 REDD+ negotiations have
pitted articulate environmental NGOS against eloquent tribal leaders.
In the past several years this debate catapulted from obscure to of
central interest to much of civil society participants at conference of
the party proceedings.120
Those engaging with nation states at the climate talks need to be as
transparent, representative, and equitable as the nation states
representatives. A human right does not become less humane or less
of a right because there is a new energy interest involved. Tribal
communities are at the crossroads of traditional and renewable energy
decisions and need to be engaged with in a manner that is mindful of
sovereign resource legal rights and centuries of environmental
experience.
Subsistence natural resource use overlaps with climate sink/source
balancing endeavors. Blue Carbon for instance is the umbrella term
that has come to be recognized as encompassing a range of ways in
which coastal and ocean sequestration of greenhouse gases can offset
continued use of fossil fuels.121 Yet, coastal communities generally,

117. See Capacity-building Portal, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION

CLIMATE, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/capacity_building/items/
7204.php.
118. See Burleson, A Climate of Extremes, supra note 41.
119. See, e.g., IUCN, REDD+ from Negotiations to Action, 46 ARBORVITAE: THE
IUCN FOREST CONSERVATION MAG. 1 (2015), at 1, http://cmsdata.iucn.org/
downloads/av46_english_web_1.pdf.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Coastal Blue Carbon, NOAA: HABITAT CONSERVATION
http://www.habitat.noaa.gov/coastalbluecarbon.html.
ON
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and tribal communities in particular rely heavily upon these forests.122
Coastal mangroves can provide mitigation and adaptation measures.
Mangroves also sustain communities many of whom do not want their
ways of life to be sacrificed for well off individuals and groups to
benefit from continued greenhouse gas emissions at the expense of
communities being able to use areas that they have come to rely upon
and may have land tenure to but that also have the capacity to provide
climate sinks.
Isle de Jean Charles exemplifies a tribal relocation endeavor in the
face of sea level rise along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana.123 It remains
an open question to what degree indigenous communities will be
required to continue to accommodate other groups of people, both near
and far, in climate mitigation and adaptation.
Climate migration has its dynamic elements. It remains unclear to
what degree communities that are not faced with front line sea level
rise but are in prime locations for carbon market trading of sink and
source “projects” will need to relocate or reduce their use of local
natural resources to make way for climate endeavors.
Transcending glacial politics to achieve innovation and climateenergy equity is a multifaceted diplomacy challenge. Migration may
be advantageous to communities whose land will disappear outright
but not for communities that have traditionally utilized green and blue
carbon sinks as subsistence inhabitants of forests and coastal
mangroves. Representatives from many of these locations have come
to the climate talks as non-state actor observers to the nation-state
decision-making process to share perspectives and seek that
indigenous rights remain within final outcome texts.
Esau Sinnok came to the Paris climate talks as an 18-year-old tribal
representative from Shishmaref in Alaska. He shared his perspective
with the media and world leaders, explaining that his community’s
island is soon to be swallowed up by the sea and ice forms later in the
winter impacting subsistence food security. Sinnok and other members

122. See id.
123. Dylan Brown, La. Tribe’s Relocation Hailed as Model for Coastal

Indigenous Groups, CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/2015/04/21/stories/1060017151 [http://perma.cc/53ML-S726].
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of front line communities offer a heightened level of urgency to
coordinate climate responses.124
Over the past several decades, the climate talks have involved
inclusive treaty body decision-making.125 This has not occurred within
a scientifically viable timeframe with which to avert critical climate
change. Yet, it has advanced global governance engagement and
involved unprecedented interactions among state and non-state actors.
Tribal, academic, youth, gender, and other groups have networked –
sharing research and analysis.126 These and their state counterparts
have compared and contrasted climate options in a myriad of
forums.127
Treaty language sets boundaries and textual anchors while treaty
negotiating records can provide evidence of intent. The Paris
Agreement acceptance linking emissions mitigation mechanism
(EMM) widens the dialogue as to how to implement broad and
effective climate mitigation and adaptation endeavors in an equitable
manner.128

124. Rachel Waldholz, For Alaskans in Paris, Climate Talks Hit Home,
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Dec. 11, 2015) http://www.alaskapublic.org/2015/12/11/foralaskans-in-paris-climate-talks-hit-home/ [http://perma.cc/]; see also, Camila
Bustos, Why Should We Care About Public Participation in Responses to Climate
Change?, NIVELA (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nivela.org/updates/why-should-wecare-about-public-participation-in-responses-to-climate-change/en [http://perma.cc/
HWM5-U3FD] (noting that: “In anticipation to the COP20 negotiations, a group of
23 countries including: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Mexico, Panama, Peru and Uruguay, submitted a proposal asking for operative
language related to public participation, access to information and informed
citizenship to be included in the 2015 climate agreement.”).
125. See Burleson, Civil Society Contributions, supra note 117.
126. See, e.g., CAN Member Organization, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.climatenetwork.org/about/members (last visited May
23, 2017).
127. See, e.g., Side Events & Exhibits, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/reports/
archive.html. Anyone interested in becoming involved can register a side event or
exhibit through the UNFCCC Side Events and Exhibits Online Registration System
(SEORS) https://seors.unfccc.int. Id.
128. Jean Chemnick, IETA Unveils Vision for Linking Trading Mechanisms,
CLIMATEWIRE (May 11, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/global_
climate_debate/stories/1060037021 [http://perma.cc/9NNZ-NXS9].
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Climate taxes and markets can reduce greenhouse gases as can
strictly enforced regulation. Entities such as the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) are in a strong position to
enforce rules on flaring and leakage from hydraulic fracturing for
instance. Each of these incentive approaches remains salient and has
its equity pros and cons. Taxes clarify the cost of reducing a unit of
greenhouse gas but do not mandate a given quantity of reduction. This
leads to the problem of actors simply internalizing the cost of the tax
into the cost of operation rather than being forced to actually reduce
emissions if they can afford not to. Markets can set strict caps on
emissions but the cost of a given unit of emissions reduction rises and
falls with supply and demand for emitting. Bans can also reduce
emissions by a set amount but do not generate a revenue stream with
which to carry out reductions. Environmental economics has
developed with regard to sulfur dioxide, fishing, and carbon permits.
Concentrations of emission and rights have been an equity concern in
each context. Hot spots of concentrated pollution may not impact
global warming in regional ways but do impact individuals with
individual human rights in disparate ways. Indigenous communities
live close to the land more so than many other peoples. Their lives and
livelihoods are at stake in global decisions to use forests and other
sinks to balance greenhouse gas emissions.
Without nation state status, tribes, cities and other jurisdictions
within the borders of nation states participated in climate talks with
NGO badges. While this is a contradiction in terms, they came as
nongovernmental organizations for the purposes of the conference of
the parties’ climate negotiations. Each registered and received a badge
permitting the entity to access events with observer status. That said
many provided substantial contributions by holding side events that
compared and contrasted evolving best practices underway around the
world.129
Those with aligned interests gathered to form groups that had the
capacity to strengthen their outreach initiatives among the larger body
of climate talks participants. Even hallways regularly became brief
129. See, e.g., Side Event During the Bonn Climate Change Conference,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CLIMATE CHANGE PORTAL (May 10, 2017),
http://www.indigenousclimate.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=252%3Aside-event-during-the-bonn-climate-change-conference&catid=3%3
Anews&lang=en [http://perma.cc/5QX7-4NHC].
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reception areas for participants of all badge stripes to exchange
perspectives and engage with government delegates and journalists.
To date, the EU has set among the most ambitious targets leading up
to 2020 with reductions of 20 percent from 1990 levels and has already
achieved a 19 percent reduction in greenhouse gases from those
levels.130 Clearly the EU has had more resources with which to make
these commitments than least developed countries. Where lessons
have been learned they can be shared and Paris Agreement processes
of engagement can build upon evolving best practices across the range
of climate matrix elements.
The 2015 Paris consensus recognizes the importance of providing
broadly agreed upon diplomatic tools to mitigate, adapt, and support
increased ambition. As blue printing goes, the Paris Agreement has
provided a rough sketch of the requisite climate action yet to be
accomplished. With the established binding commitments by all
parties to submit and implement Nationally Determined Contributions
countries will be able to regularly compare mitigation, adaptation, and
support in a process of global review.131 Ratcheting up ambition every
five years still requires support, yet the finance goal of mobilizing
$100 billion by 2020 has now stretched to 2025 and any loss and
damage recognition does not provide a basis for liability or
compensation. Funding can flow through cap and trade that does not
double count emissions reductions internationally. In the tradition of
the Clean Development Mechanism, a new mechanism will facilitate
international emission trading to reduce greenhouse gases.
As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon notes, “the work starts
now.”132 Paris climate consensus building has approached problem
solving as a facilitative rather than punitive process of sustained
engagement.133 Parties have gathered national commitments into an
130. See 2020 Climate & Energy Package, CLIMATE ACTION,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en [perma.cc/EA9Y-MD22].
131. See, e.g., CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, http://www.carbontracker.org/ (last
visited May 23, 2017).
132. Graham Readfearn, Paris Agreement a Victory for Climate Science and
Ultimate Defeat for Fossil Fuels, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/planet-oz/2015/dec/12/paris-agreementa-victory-for-climate-science-and-ultimate-defeat-for-fossil-fuels
[http://perma.cc/QV69-G8DL].
133. See Paris Agreement, Art. 15, supra note 4, at 29.
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international instrument with legal effect and placed some strategic
stepping-stones, if not a robust foundation, for policy coordination.134
Yet, efforts to have gender equity, human rights, intergenerational
equity, etc. in the operative language fell short, as did liability and
compensation for loss and damage. Landing zones were also never
agreed upon for establishing a top down element to the 5-year stock
taking cycles and inclusion of international shipping and aviation also
failed to occur in Paris, as did efforts to state a peak year and point at
which emissions and sinks would balance each other let alone a point
by which 1.5°C or even 2°C temperature goals would be met. These
are serious omissions. Yet given the trajectory of climate talks, the
Paris Agreement marks a diplomatic breakthrough to agree upon
legally binding processes. This was a breakthrough that was a long
time in coming and for which much diplomatic engagement occurred
to find consensus.
Paris Climate Conference participants facilitated global agreement
on important core elements of a climate regime, including cycles of
nationally determined contributions reporting, review, and ratcheting
up stocktaking updates. Detailed reporting and review rules remain an
open question for future climate talks. Climate cooperation “by all
Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private
sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities,
local communities and indigenous peoples,” are helping ratchet up
ambition and implementation of mitigation, adaptation, support,
technology sharing, and the myriad other elements of the evolving
global climate response. Next steps for climate action include: (1) five
year reviews to increase commitments to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and collectively adapt to climate changes; (2) rigorous
transparency/ accountability for governments to stay on track with
their commitments; and (3) support to poor nations to adapt and adopt
environmentally and socially sound energy and resilience
technologies. Universal agreement and broad country climate plan
implementation signals robust innovation, investments, and
sustainable development opportunities globally.

134. See Those Who Slam the Paris Climate Talks are Missing the Point, NEW
SCIENTIST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22830473200-those-who-slam-the-paris-climate-talks-are-missing-the-point/
[http://perma.cc/6YHX-28Z6].
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The Paris climate summit sends a SOS signal for broad, effective
climate action. Regions within nation-state borders are well positioned
to respond to this SOS call with rapid and effective climate
implementation.135 The International Indigenous People’s Forum on
Climate Change has offered amendment language to the negotiating
text calling for recognition of indigenous cultural knowledge and the
use of a bottom-up engagement that meaningfully involves the
advance consent of affected communities.136 Dynamic depth of field is
within the capacity of not only nation states but also within the
capacity of sub and supra groupings that have made contributions to
coordinating complex climate change challenges. We have all been
participant observers of the climate crisis. We can all participate in
multidimensional problem solving to balance sinks and sources.
While international law is a young enterprise as human endeavors
go, it is not robust enough to regulate strict climate-energy adherence
to a detailed legal regime. The current approach is a facilitative rather
than punitive one, relying on the sharing of best practices. For this
approach to effectively and equitably respond to climate change,
greater dynamic governance engagement is called for. Arguably, that
engagement can build upon the traditional wisdom, resilience, and
innovation of the world’s indigenous communities. That is not to say
that they should hold the weight of the world on their shoulders any
more than anyone else, albeit they are in some of the most vulnerable
front line climate communities. Rather, indigenous engagement in

135. See Elizabeth Burleson, Tribes as Essential Partners in Achieving
Sustainable Governance: Legal Strategies for Greening Local Government, LONDON
SCH. OF ECON. AND POL. SCI. (2011); see also Rodgers & Burleson, supra note 115;
TIMO KOIVUROVA & WALIUL HASANAT, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARCTIC LAW
(Timo Koivurova & Waliul Hasanat eds., 2013); Timo Koivurova and Waliul
Hasanat ed., U. ARCTIC (2013), http://www.uarctic.org/media/1318885/currentdevelopments-in-arctic-law-2013.pdf; Burleson, Civil Society Contributions, supra
note 117; Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to Achieve
Good Governance, 40 AKRON LAW REVIEW 207 (2007).
136. Anna Spain, Who’s Going to Copenhagen?: The Rise of Civil Society in
International Treaty-Making, 13 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 1 (2009),
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight091211pdf.pdf.
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climate-energy-water governance can substantially advance climate
coordination.137
Climate coordination involves energy security that is mindful of
environmental integrity and human rights. Tribes have shown climate
leadership.138 As front line communities many have come together to
play a catalytic role in global recognition of the 1.5°C challenge. Tribal
communities are at the crossroads of traditional and renewable energy
decisions and need to be engaged with respect and in a manner that is
mindful of sovereign resource legal rights and centuries of
environmental experience.
Latin American natural resource use has increasingly impacted
indigenous lives and livelihoods. Greater global understanding and
broad willingness to defending human rights defenders is long
overdue. The climate talks may be a slow, deliberative process but the
means are important in their own right. Stalling climate mitigation
measures because money can be made in fossil fuel extraction is not a
justification for lengthy deliberations. Genuinely understanding a
broad range of climate-energy-water perspectives in an economicsocial-environmental sustainability governance matrix is worth
deliberative Indabas and other exchanges.139
Indigenous lives and livelihoods need not be the casualties of
climate coordination globally. It should not take brave indigenous
women losing their lives for governments to investigate corporate
illegal behavior. Death threats by corporate employees against
indigenous community members need to be addressed by authorities
consistently and not merely when national aid packages are at stake as

137. See, e.g., Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples: Measures Taken to Implement the Declaration, Division for
Social Policy and Development Indigenous Peoples (May 5, 2017), NY,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/unpfii-sessions-2/
sixteenth-session.html [http://perma.cc/6VV2-2JUC].
138. See, e.g., Inter-Tribal Youth Climate Leadership Congress, CLIMATE.GOV,
https://www.climate.gov/teaching/climate-youth-engagement/case-studies/intertribal-youth-climate-leadership-congress (last visited May 23, 2017).
139. See e.g., MARA SILINA, IS EVERYTHING RIGHT WITH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
CLIMATE RELATED DECISIONS? (European Envtl. Bureau (EEB) & European ECO
Forum
ed.,
Geneva,
2015),
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
pp/ppdm/5th_PPDM/Presentations/MSilina.pdf.
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occurred in the recent Central American murder of Berta Cáceres.140
Honduras authorities have recently arrested four men in connection
with the murder of indigenous environmental and human rights
defender Berta Cáceres.141 Two of the men are connected to the
company building the Zarca Dam that Cáceres opposed. The company
Desarrollos Energéticos SA (DESA) seeks to dam the Gualcarque
River – considered sacred to the Lenca indigenous community. Sergio
Ramón Rodriguez, the dam’s engineer, and Douglas Geovanny
Bustillo, the former head of DESA’s security, had threatened to kill
Cáceres.142
This is not an isolated incident and should not be a one off effort at
pursuing justice. Climate change impacts due process, equal
protection, and civil rights to lives and property. Environmental and
human rights interests are at odds in forestry and water contexts,
leaving climate negotiators the careful challenge to equitably protect
carbon sinks such as rain forests without disregarding indigenous land
rights.
REDD+ negotiations have pitted articulate environmental NGOS
against eloquent tribal leaders. In the past several years this debate
catapulted from obscure to of central interest to much of civil society
participants at conference of the party proceedings.
The social license to operate is related to the social cost of carbon
and each become more well recognized with climate outreach that
continuously and clearly articulates the opportunity costs of engaging
in a given activity – be it natural resource extraction or subsistence
livelihoods.
No one is called upon to live in terror. Terrorism and civil unrest
arise out of desperation. Paris stood strong in the face of terrorism at
the brink of global climate coordination in 2015. Understanding that
energy and human security are not mutually exclusive is long overdue.
Recognizing that global climate coordination can overcome collective
inaction is the first step in making what has broadly been called
impossible increasingly inevitable.
140. See Jonathan Blitzer, The Death of Berta Cáceres, NEW YORKER (Mar. 11,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-death-of-berta-caceres
[http://perma.cc/RB3L-JLSX].
141. See id.
142. See id.
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What is security? – this has been an evolving shared norm as peoples
become ever more enmeshed globally. During the Paris negotiations,
the Washington Post published the widespread experience of most
climate talks participants for decades – we continue to pour over
“confusing texts full of noncommittal brackets. Upon this, it seems,
does the fate of the planet depend. We don’t know yet which brackets
will come off.”143 We do know the stakes are high, that it is not hard
to blow up urban infrastructure to make a point, and that common
ground can be elusive.
The Paris that this author recalled as a school child commuting by
public bus has evolved as well. Paris deserves substantial
congratulation not only for hosting historic multilateral diplomacy
success but also for its own endeavors to address climate change.
While pollution remains an issue, public transport is extensive and
effective. Since the traditional parade was called off due to the
terrorists attacks that preceded the Paris climate talks, this author was
able to reach Fontainebleau Forrest within an hour and a half by public
transport for under $30 USD. This ancient array of rocks tumbling in
and out of mossy thickets of trees grounded the climate talks 2015 for
this author in a manner that was both micro and macro. Micro in that
it was among the first forays into forest habitat, searching for edible
chestnuts and such as a child, and macro because forests are global
greenhouse gas equilibrators extraordinaire. Not all vegetation
exchanges carbon in the same way and forests can vary in their
capacities to be effective carbon sinks. That said, forests are
biologically diverse and not easily restored in timeframes pertinent to
the climate challenge. It is critical to sustain forests and forest
livelihoods in a manner that neither leaves forests lacking critters nor
creatures lacking forests. Humans have not mastered geoengineering
on the micro or macro scale. Existing sinks are effective carbon
sequestrators irrespective of our ingenuity with which to design our
way into a downward curve of greenhouse gas emissions. Aforestation
and wetland restoration can substantially enhance existing nature
based carbon sinks. Helping forest and coastal communities sustain
existing ecosystems is a highly effective means by which to lower
carbon levels.

143. Mooney, supra note 112.
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Climate solutions are not one-size-fits all. Yet communities in
mountainous or arid land can find shared best practices. Similarly,
cities can find solutions that can benefit other urban locals. One means
by which to share such endeavors is through the new Capacitybuilding Portal hosted by the secretariat of the UNFCCC.144 Another
way to broaden know-how is for cities to facilitate climate monitoring.
At present, NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 is the only U.S.
satellite capable of measuring carbon dioxide emissions. Satellite,
airplane-based instrumentation, and ground-based networks globally
are at early stages of accurately monitoring greenhouse gas
emissions.145 Contributing to this mapping endeavor can play a
substantial role in helping jurisdictions, large and small, to engage in
collectively implementing and strengthening Paris commitments.
Game theory suggests that indeterminate future interactions can lead
to cooperation. In other words, if an interaction is a one-off it is less
likely to produce win-win dynamics. Coordinating engagement that
keeps entities invested in each other’s progress can produce win-win
dynamics. Compacts do just this. Be they water compacts, carbon
market compacts, or epistemic community compacts, e.g. Compact of
Mayors, there is value in coordinating climate responses.146 Entities
other than nation states have shown substantial leadership in this
regard.
Post Paris, it is high time to recognize the heavy lifting that the city
of Paris engaged in to bring about the degree of climate consensus that
occurred in 2015. While it is by no means time to celebrate broad
climate successes, the Paris Agreement and its related COP 21
Decision represent high diplomacy on the part of Paris and all the
entities with which Paris coordinated. Keeping this coordination
momentum ramping up is the challenge going forward.
Indigenous communities and front line cities may share little at first
glance. Each has networks with which to advance climate friendly
decision-making as a core endeavor of governance. By doing so each
can also model evolving best practices through green design and

144. See UNFCCC, Capacity-building Portal, supra note 118.
145. See Vaidyanathan, supra note 2.
146. COMPACT OF MAYORS, http://www.compactofmayors.org (last visited May

23, 2017).
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sensible building codes as well as effective and eloquent international
diplomacy.
Political will increases with the degree to which the stakes are high
and immediate. Front line indigenous diplomats have been and
continue to be among the change agents that have brought about
climate coordination to date. We are the song-line that weaves
evolving humanity. Governance innovation and innovation
governance can together engage dynamic participatory decisionmaking to address energy-water-climate challenges equitably and
effectively.

